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THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS: TERRITORIALISM AND
FUNCTIONALISM
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN*
For at least fifty years, American legal scholars have engaged in
intense debate concerning the proper methodology by which choice
of law decisions should be made. Beginning with the works of Wal-
ter Wheeler Cook,1 Ernest Lorenzen,2 and David Cavers,3 a sub-
stantial body of legal criticism was mounted against the traditional
choice of law schema that prevailed in the courts and was en-
shrined in the first Restatement.4 This criticism culminated in the
seminal work of Brainerd Currie,5 which not only took exception to
the traditional approach, but also proposed a new theory to replace
it. Currie's "governmental interest analysis," developed in the
1950's and 1960's, has garnered strong praise from most choice of
law scholars,6 although it has been assailed by a small minority of
scholars who defend a revised version of the traditional approach.
*B.A., Pennsylvania State University, J.D., University of Southern California; LL.M., Ge-
orgetown University. Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law.
1. See W. CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942).
2. See E. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947).
3. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173 (1933).
4. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
5. See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
6. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 4-5, 39, 201-04 (1971);
Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The
Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TFx. L. REV. 141 (1967); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal
System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963); Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-A
Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 719 (1974); Kanowitz, Comparative Impairment and Bet-
ter Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 255 (1978); Kay, Com-
ments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 584 (1968); McDougal, Comprehensive In-
terest Analysis Versus Reformulated Governmental Interest Analysis: An Appraisal in the
Context of Choice-of-Law Problems Concerning Contributory and Comparative Negligence,
26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 439 (1979); Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of
Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181 (1977); Traynor, Is This
Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tax. L. REv. 657 (1959).
7. See W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 523-25
(6th ed. 1971); Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers-The Penn-
sylvania Method, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 373 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Enlightened Ter-
ritorialism]; Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner: Where Are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HOFSTRA
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Although interest analysis has played a vital role in the abandon-
ment of the traditional approach by the courts in some twenty-
seven jurisdictions, courts in seventeen jurisdictions have rejected
it explicitly in favor of retaining the traditional approach.s Thus,
the controversy persists in the court as well as in the academy.
THE ROOTS OF THE CONTROVERSY: CHOICE OF LAW THEORY
The traditional approach to choice of law is also referred to as
the territorial approach, in deference to the premise upon which it
is based. According to that premise, a state has authority to regu-
late occurrences within its territory, but no further; a state's power
terminates abruptly at its border, where the correlative power of
other states begins.9 Therefore, choice of law decisions under the
traditional approach follow the maxim that events are to be gov-
erned by the law of the state in which they occur.
Critics of the traditional approach question the very premise
upon which it is founded. 10 They point out that the premise of the
territorial approach, that a state may regulate only occurrences
that transpire within its borders, is nothing more than a bald as-
sertion." As long as constitutional requirements are met, a state
court has authority to apply whatever law it chooses to the case
before it."' The maxim of the traditional approach actually should
be posed as a question: should an event necessarily be governed by
the law of the state in which it occurred? Adherents of the interest
analysis have demonstrated that in many cases the answer to this
question is a resounding "no." Professor Cavers pointed out that
traditional choice of law rules completely ignore the content of the
L. REv. 104 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner]; Twerski, To Where
Does One Attach the Horses?, 61 Ky. L.J. 393 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Horses].
8. Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in Con-
flicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 975, 975-76 n.2 (1977).
9. See J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICrs OF LAW § 5.2 (1935); J. STORY, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 7, 8, 18, 20, 23 (1st ed. 1834).
10. E. LORENZEN, supra note 2, at 1-18; W. COOK, supra note 1, at 48-70.
11. E. LORENZEN, supra note 2, at 1-18; W. CooK, supra note 1, at 48-70.
12. Supreme Court decisions clearly indicate that the premise of territoriality is not a
constitutional requirement. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Car-
roll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Watson v. Employers Liab. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954);
Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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laws relevant to a case, and thereby often work at cross purposes to
those laws."3 This cogent observation was developed further by
Professor Currie, who explained that the mere occurrence of an
event within a state does not mean that the interests of that state
will be advanced by applying its laws to the event.14 Conversely,
the interests of a state may be advanced by applying its laws to an
event that has occurred outside its borders.1 5
As an illustration of these principles, consider a case in which
John Doe and Richard Roe, who are citizens of state A, execute a
contract in state B. Suppose that John Doe is twenty years old and
under the law of state A has full legal capacity to make contracts,
but does not have such capacity under the law of state B. State B's
rule of law is based upon the policy that persons under the age of
twenty-one are not competent to enter into binding agreements
and therefore should be relieved from their contracts. State A's
rule of law is based upon the policy that persons over the age of
eighteen are competent to enter into binding agreements and
therefore parties who transact with them should be able to rely
upon their contracts." Under the traditional approach, the capac-
ity of John Doe to enter into the contract would be governed by
the law of state B, the place where the contract was made. How-
ever, state B has no possible interest in regulating the contracting
capacity of John Doe, a citizen of state A. State B has no interest
in relieving John Doe from his contract when John Doe's own state
believes he was competent to make the contract and upholds its
binding nature. On the other hand, state A has a very definite in-
terest in regulating this transaction in order to protect the contrac-
13. Cavers, supra note 3, at 180; see, e.g., Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. 126,
11 So. 803 (1892). In Alabama Great Southern Railroad, an Alabama plaintiff employed by
the defendant Alabama railroad was injured as a result of fellow employees' negligence while
the train was travelling through Mississippi. Suit was brought in the Alabama courts. An
Alabama statute had abolished the common law fellow-servant defense to a charge of em-
ployer negligence. Mississippi retained the common law rule. In choosing to apply the law of
Mississippi as the place of injury, the Alabama court defeated the Alabama statutory pur-
poses of improving the railroad's standard of care through imposition of liability and of
compensating Alabama plaintiffs.
14. B. CujRm, supra note 5, at 180.
15. See id. at 183.
16. This hypothetical is a variation of one used by Currie and explained by him in fuller
detail. See id. at 77-127.
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tual reliance of its citizen, Richard Roe. State A's lack of territorial
connection to the contract does not negate the presence of state
A's interest in having the contract governed by its law. Conversely,
state B's territorial connection with the contract does not give rise
to a state B interest in having the contract governed by its law.
The territorial aspects of the situation are absolutely irrelevant to
the determination of either state's interest in the application of its
law.
Interest analysis seeks to remedy the nonteleological operation
of the traditional approach. According to interest analysis, choice
of law decisions should not be dictated by territorial contacts, but
should be made so as to accommodate the purposes or policies for
which the laws germane to a case have been promulgated. This re-
quires an identification of the policy that underlies the law of each
concerned state and a determination of whether, in light of that
policy, each state has an interest in having its law applied to the
case. The foundation of interest analysis is the simple premise that
choice of law issues present the same general problem as other le-
gal issues, namely, interpreting and applying the content of laws.
Thus, interest analysis is a functional process; choice of law deci-
sions made under it are made for some purpose. In every case in
which the interest analysis is operative, it is intended to serve the
policies underlying the laws relevant in the case. 17
The criticism levelled by Cook, Lorenzen, Cavers, and Currie at
the traditional choice of law approach can be viewed as a micro-
cosm of the criticism that legal realists direct toward traditional
legal thought in general. Karl Llewellyn, a principal exponent of
legal realism, referred to the traditional legal mode of thought as
the Formal Style."" The Formal Style, he explained, is a manner of
thought"9 concerned with logic, not policy. It operates on the
model of "if x, then y," never inquiring as to the reason, if any,
that x should produce y.20 The traditional choice of law approach
17. See generally R. CRAMTON & D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUES-
TIONS 252-53 (1968); Sedler, supra note 6, at 183.
18. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 38-39 (1960).
19. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 211 (1973). "In Llewel-
lyn's usage the term [style] refers to the manner of thought ... rather than to ... literary
style, in so far as these are distinguishable." Id. at 210.
20. See id. at 213.
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operates in like manner; if a contract is made in a certain state,
then legal questions concerning it are to be governed by that
state's law. There is logic, but no purpose, policy, or reason. In
contradistinction to the Formal Style, Llewellyn described the
Grand Style, which seeks to effectuate the policy that underlies
laws.21 The model of the Grand Style is: if x, then y in order to
produce effect z, for reason z, or to remedy mischief z. 22 Operating
in the mode of the Grand Style, the interest analysis directs that
choice of law decisions be made so as to achieve the policies for
which laws are enacted.
Some modern critics of the interest analysis retain faith in the
territorial premise of the traditional approach.23 "Neoterritorial-
ists" assert that events should be governed by the laws of the state
in which they occur because that is what the public expects. Pro-
fessor Cavers, a strong critic of the traditional approach in his
early career, later converted to neoterritorialism, 24 arguing that be-
cause our states and nations are "territorially organized," a depar-
ture from the territorial premise causes "a wrench away from cus-
tomary attitudes toward law."'2 5 This is likely to cause, Cavers
suggested, a feeling that the law is discriminatory.2 Building on
this theme, Professor Twerski states that expectations play a "po-
tent role" in our lives, affecting not only conduct, but a sense of
tranquility as well.27 He argues that "people have a right to expect
a regularity and rhythm from the law."'2 8 An additional argument
is that public confidence in the legal system is undermined when it
operates in an unexpected manner.29
21. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 18, at 36-38.
22. W. TWIMNG, supra note 19, at 213.
23. See generally Twerski, Neumeier v. Kuehner, supra note 7; Twerski, Horses, supra
note 7.
24. Throughout his career, Professor Cavers' views have been quite vicissitudinous. An
early critic of the territorialism of the traditional approach, see Cavers, supra note 3, at 179-
80, he later sought to combine the interest analysis with neoterritorialism, see D. CAVERS,
TiE CHOICE-oF-LAw PROCESS (1965), and still later sought to replace interest analysis with
neoterritorialism, see Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, 3
RECuEIL DES Couns 75, 146-47 (1970).
25. D. CAVERs, supra note 24, at 135.
26. Id.
27. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism, supra note 7, at 381-82.
28. Id. at 382.
29. See von Mehren, Recent Trends in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REv.
1980]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
There are several possible responses to the neoterritorialist argu-
ment that laws should function on a territorial basis to meet public
expectations. First, if public expectation of a law's application
would work to the detriment of the policy expressed by the law,
that public expectation should not be honored.30 Second, as Pro-
fessor Sedler has described, people expect laws to operate on the
territorial premise only because the legal system itself has fostered
that expectation by emphasizing the traditional territorial ap-
proach. Therefore, to argue that the law should continue to be ap-
plied on a territorial basis to meet public expectations aroused by
prior territorial application is not only self-serving but circular as
well.31
The final and strongest response to the neoterritorialists is to
question their belief that people expect laws to operate territori-
ally. At first blush that belief may seem correct, but on further
consideration it becomes highly questionable. In an attempt to
prove that there is a public expectation that laws operate territori-
ally, Twerski presents an unduly complicated hypothetical. He de-
scribes a young married couple dining at the home of Mr. and Mrs.
X. The young husband makes a remark about his mother-in-law
that leads to a nasty argument between the couple. The next
morning, Mrs. X phones the young bride to offer advice, and the
incident is a topic of conversation in the hosts' home for at least a
week.32 Twerski asserts that the results would be quite different
had the argument occurred at some other place and had Mr. and
Mrs. X been told about it rather than having been witnesses to it.
In the latter situation, Twerski claims that the argument "cer-
tainly" would not be discussed in the X household for a week and
that Mrs. X "definitely" would not call the bride to offer advice.33
Twerski implies that the argument in the first situation is within
the concern of- the X's, because it occurred in their house, while
the argument in the second situation is not within their concern
because it occurred elsewhere. This implication is manifest from
Twerski's statement following the hypothetical that "one factor
927, 945-46 (1975).
30. See generally Sedler, supra note 6, at 208.
31. Id. at 207.
32. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism, supra note 7, at 383.
33. Id.
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which leads human beings to react is the very sight of an injus-
tice." -1 For emphasis, he adds that "seeing is reacting."35
I find Professor Twerski's suppositions about human nature
quite unconvincing. To the contrary, it is not "certain" that the
argument in the second situation will not be discussed for a week
in the X household. If Mr. and Mrs. X find the topic interesting,
discussion of the argument is just as likely in the second situation
as in the first. Nor is it "definite" that in the second situation Mrs.
X will not call the bride to offer advice. If Mrs. X possesses a sym-
pathetic nature or is a close friend of the bride, she might be just
as likely to call in one situation as in the other. At best, Twerski
has selected a rather arguable hypothetical to prove his point;
rather than prove it, he opens it to question.
A variation on Twerski's hypothetical demonstrates that people
do in fact expect some rules to have extraterritorial effect. Suppose
that some time prior to dining at the X's, Twerski's young hus-
band had made the same joke about his mother-in-law at his own
dining room table. Further suppose that his wife was insulted by
the joke and asked her husband to refrain from making such re-
marks about her mother. The husband agreed to this "rule," the
purpose of which was to prevent affronting his wife. Obviously, the
husband and wife expected this rule to govern behavior beyond the
confines of their own home. That is, they expected the rule to have
extraterritorial effect. Indeed, to accomplish its purpose of avoid-
ing insult to the wife, the rule must be given extraterritorial
application.
People expect that some rules will have extraterritorial effect,
while others will not. When parents promulgate the rule that their
child may not eat candy, they expect the child to obey that rule
irrespective of location. On the other hand, when parents promul-
gate a rule that their child may not play blaring music on the
stereo, they expect that rule to apply only in their own home. If
the child's friends' parents allow loud music in their homes, that is
their own business. To some degree, the expectations considered
here reflect the purposes for which the rules have been adopted.
Because parents prohibit their children from eating candy in order
34. Id. at 384.
35. Id.
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to safeguard their health, the rule is expected to apply outside of
the family household; otherwise its purpose will be defeated. How-
ever, when parents prohibit their children from playing blaring
music, their purpose is to secure peace and quiet in the home. The
rule is not expected to apply at other households in which the re-
sidents are not bothered by loud music. Thus, the expectations in
the described hypotheticals are functional; they are consistent with
the purposes for which the rules were adopted.
It is salutary when public expectation concerning the interpreta-
tion of a law is consistent with the effectuation of the law's pur-
pose. Unfortunately, this correlation does not always exist. Regard-
less of public expectations, rules should be applied to effectuate
the purposes for which they were enacted. Some rules are meant to
regulate occurrences within a territory, while other rules have pur-
poses that are extraterritorial. The interest analysis easily accom-
modates those laws that should be acknowledged as territorially
based because their purpose is to regulate occurrences within a cer-
tain area.3 6 Under the interest analysis, the state in which the oc-
currence transpires is recognized as having an interest that its law
govern the case. For instance, if a state has adopted a tort law not
only to compensate injured persons but also to deter hazardous
conduct within the state, it has an interest in regulating such con-
duct whenever it occurs within the borders of the state. Even if
both the tortfeasor and the victim are nonresidents, if the conduct
giving rise to the tort occurred within the state, there is a state
interest in having its law applied to the victim's claim against the
tortfeasor. In such a case, the interest analysis acknowledges the
territorial function of the law.37
The interest analysis also can accommodate the legitimate ex-
pectations that persons have concerning a law's operation, even the
36. "[The interest analysis] recognizes that the occurrence of an act within a state may
give rise to a strong interest on the part of that state in implementing its admonitory and
regulatory policies." Sedler, The Territorial Imperative: Automobile Accidents and the Sig-
nificance of a State Line, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 394, 394 (1971). See also Gaither v. Myers, 404
F.2d 216, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581, 587
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 178 F.2d 888 (1st
Cir. 1949); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, -, 82 N.W.2d 365, 368 (1957).
37. See Sedler, supra note 36, at 394.
234 [Vol. 22:227
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expectation of territorial operation of a law.38 For example, in Peo-
ple v. One 1953 Ford Victoria,3 9 the State of California sought to
have a mortgagee's lien on a Ford Victoria automobile, used by the
mortgagor to transport marijuana illegally within California, for-
feited in its favor. According to the laws of California the mortga-
gee's lien on the car was forfeitable because the mortgagee had not
made an investigation into the mortgagor's character. However, the
mortgage had been made in Texas, where the mortgagee's lien was
not forfeitable.40 When faced with this conflict of law, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court followed Texas law on the ground that, al-
though California had an interest in having its forfeiture law ap-
plied to mortgaged automobiles used for illegal purposes within
California, that interest did not extend to situations where the
mortgage had been made outside of the state. To apply California
law to out-of-state mortgages would take the mortgagee by surprise
and defeat his legitimate expectations. 1
Ford Victoria demonstrates that the interest analysis is not
blind to the parties' legitimate expectations concerning the law. It
should be remembered, however, that expectations are not always
legitimate or present. Hoping to find the purposiveness needed in
their approach,'42 neoterritorialists overemphasize the parties' ex-
pectations. They often see expectations where none exist. For ex-
ample, no one has any expectations in tort cases, because accidents
are unexpected. Nevertheless, interest analysis can accommodate
readily those situations presenting genuine expectations that
should be recognized.
THE QUEST FOR RATIONALITY
Territorialism
As noted above, the premise of both the traditional and the neo-
territorial approaches is that a state has authority to regulate only
38. See R. WEiNrrAuB, supra note 6, at 204-06; Sedler, supra note 36, at 394-95.
39. 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
40. Id. at -, 311 P.2d at 480-81.
41. Id. at., 311 P.2d at 482. See also Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, -, 360 P.2d
906, 909, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 269 (1961).
42. See notes 18-21 supra & accompanying text.
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those events occurring within its own borders. 4 Therefore, occur-
rences are to be governed by the law of the state in which they
transpire. However, because legal transactions often transpire in
more than one state, courts must struggle with the decision of
which law should govern a tort action when, for example, negli-
gence committed in state A causes injury in state B. Equally uncer-
tain is the determination of the law to govern a contract when an
offer is made in state A, a counteroffer in state B, and an accept-
ance in state C.
The traditional approach deals with such problems by designat-
ing certain occurrences as key events which demark the location of
the vesting of a right." Hence, the traditional approach sometimes
is referred to as the "vested rights theory" because only those
rights which vest within a state are subject to regulation under its
laws.4'5 For example, tort rights traditionally vest at the place of
injury rather than the place of negligence.'6 According to the ma-
jority rule, contract rights vest at the place the contract is made,47
while the minority rule asserts that they vest at the place the con-
tract is to be performed.4 There is a certain beguiling logic to all
of this, but it is a logic that is superficial at best. Moreover, the
logic fails to define what determines a key event. Thus, the major
philosophic deficiency of the vested rights theory is that rights vest
whenever the courts say they do, and courts, without explanation,
may designate one occurrence to be the magical key event that op-
erates to vest a right. Lacking any rational basis, the traditional
rules serve no purpose other than to have rules for the sake of hav-
ing them.
Neoterritorialists admit the bankruptcy of the vested rights the-
ory,49 but retain faith in the premise of territoriality.50 According
to neoterritorialism, laws are territorially based, and therefore
43. See text accompanying notes 9, 23-29 supra.
44. R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFLicTs LAW 205-06 (2d ed. 1968).
45. See A. EHRENZWEiG, A TRFATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 10 (2d ed. 1962).
46. H. GOODRiCH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 165-66 (4th ed. 1964).
47. Id. at 201, 212.
48. Id. at 201, 213.
49. See, e.g., D. CAvERS, supra note 24, at 65-66; Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism,
supra note 7, at 377.
50. D. CAVRS, supra note 24, at 134-35, 139-40; Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism,
supra note 7, at 390.
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choice of law decisions should be dictated by the principle that
events are governed by the law of the state in which they oc-
curred.51 This poses for neoterritorialism the same problem that
plagues the traditional approach: when the relevant events have
occurred in more than one state, which state's law should govern
the case is uncertain. The neoterritorialist response to this problem
is an attempt to find "enlightened" or rational criteria to aid in
selecting the law of one of the states with a territorial connection
to the controversy.52 However, the rational criteria proposed by ne-
oterritorialists are few and far between and of questionable ration-
ality. Professor Cavers, who later in his career became one of the
leading advocates of neoterritorialism, 5 advanced seven "princi-
ples of preference,"" which read more like rules than principles, in
an attempt to invest territorialism with rationality. The principles'
coverage of only a small fraction of choice of law problems demon-
strates the futility of searching for rational standards by which to
evaluate territorial contacts.55 Moreover, the purported rationality
of the few principles advanced by Cavers is highly arguable. Pro-
fessor Baade does not find them to be particularly rational, 5  and
even Professor Twerski, a neoterritorialist himself, has taken ex-
ception to some of them.
The irrationality of Cavers' territorial principles is manifest in
his first principle, wherein he asserts that when the laws of the
state where an injury occurs set a higher standard of conduct or
standard of financial protection against injury than do the laws of
the state where the person causing the injury acts or has his home,
the laws of the state where the injury occurs should govern.58
Cavers asserts this principle to be rational because the state where
the injury occurs has established standards of safety to protect
51. See D. CAvERs, supra note 24, at 135, 139.
52. See generally Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism, supra note 7, at 373-74.
53. See note 24 supra.
54. D. CAVERS, supra note 24, at 139, 146, 159, 166, 177, 181, 194.
55. See notes 69-70 infra & accompanying text.
56. Baade, supra note 6, at 179.
57. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism, supra note 7, at 375, 377.
58. D. CAvS, supra note 24, at 139. The principle excepts cases in which the injured
party has such a strong relationship with the person causing the injury and the state in
which the parties reside that the legal relationship should be governed by the laws of that
state. Id. at 144-45.
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persons within its borders, and these standards of safety will be
impaired if persons who cause injury within the state are not sub-
ject to them. 9 This reasoning ignores the salient point that the
state where the person causing the injury has acted or resided also
has established standards, according to which the person's behav-
ior is not culpable and may even be considered worthy of encour-
agement. Cavers fails to answer why the standards of one state
should take precedence over another. Thus, he focuses unjustifi-
ably upon the standards of only one of the concerned states, ignor-
ing the other.
Cavers' shortsightedness is demonstrated in one of his own ex-
amples, which he implies is exemplary of the soundness of his first
principle.6 0 The example, a variation of an actual case,6 1 involves a
Californian who is injured in an accident in California and files a
personal injury action in the California courts against the adminis-
trator of the deceased tortfeasor's estate. The action is filed after
the death of the tortfeasor, a citizen of Arizona. Contrary to Cali-
fornia law, under Arizona law personal injury actions do not sur-
vive the death of the tortfeasor. According to Cavers' first princi-
ple, California law, as the law of the place where the injury
occurred, should govern the case. Cavers believes the application of
California law to be rational because it enforces the standards of
safety established by the state where the injury occurred. Cavers
states further that he would hope that even an Arizona court
would follow the California rule and thereby refuse to shelter the
estate of an Arizona citizen from "the injuries he had done in Cali-
fornia and for which California's financial protection plan would
hold a decedent's estate liable."'62
There is no rebuttal to Professor Cavers' assertion that Califor-
nia's policy will be impaired if its rule of law is not applied to the
case. Nevertheless, Cavers overlooks entirely the impairment of
Arizona's policy. In disregarding Arizona's policy, Cavers fails to
address why it is rational to favor California's policy over Ari-
zona's. Actually, Cavers' selection of this hypothetical to prove his
59. Id. at 139-40.
60. Id. at 141-42.
61. See Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953). See also B. CuRRmE,
supra note 5, at 128.
62. D. CAvFas, supra note 24, at 142.
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point is a disingenuous way of masking his indifference to Arizona
policy, because the Arizona rule against survival of causes of action
is a rule unlikely to command such sympathy. As Professor Currie
observed, it is an archaic rule that probably is a holdover from the
outdated notion that tort law is penal rather than compensatory.63
Founded upon an outmoded theory, the rule seems to serve little,
if any, valid purpose today. Thus, we are likely to believe subcon-
sciously that the Arizona rule fosters no worthwhile policy at all,
and therefore California's efficacious policy should prevail. How-
ever, if some sympathy can be evoked for the Arizona rule, the flaw
in Cavers' first principle becomes more apparent. The modern pol-
icy underlying the Arizona rule is that it is unfair for the benefi-
ciaries of a decedent's estate to be held accountable for the torts
committed by the decedent." While disputed, this policy nonethe-
less represents the legitimate policy of the State of Arizona. As
such, it is entitled to as much deference as the California policy.
By elevating California's policy and ignoring Arizona's, Cavers'
first principle offers the pretense of rationality but not the reality
of it.
The fallacy of Cavers' principle is even more flagrant in a second
hypothetical, which he denotes as "a harder case."6 5 This hypo-
thetical concerns a-political speech in state Y that libels a public
official of state X. Under the law of state X, the speaker is entitled
to only a qualified privilege for the libel, while the law of state Y
provides an absolute privilege."6 Here, the clash between the poli-
cies of the two states is dramatic. State X, where the injury oc-
curred, has a policy of compensating persons for such injuries;
state Y where the conduct occurred, has a different, but equally
worthy, policy of allowing such speech so as to foster the fullest
possible debate on issues of public concern. In this situation, appli-
cation of Cavers' first principle amounts to the selection of the law
of state X, where the injury occurred, to the exclusion of the policy
of state Y. To do so is no more rational than not.
Professor Cavers himself is ambivalent about the validity of his
63. B. CURRIE, supra note 5, at 143-44; J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAws-CASES AND MATER-
IALs 224 (1978).
64. B. CURRIE, supra note 5, at 144.
65. D. CAvERs, supra note 24, at 142.
66. Id.
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first principle. For instance, he attaches an exception to itel and
offers several qualifications to its application.68 Cavers' ambiva-
lence carries over to all seven of his principles, each of which is
qualified in one way or another. Moreover, when he originally set
forth the seven principles, Professor Cavers advanced them as a
means for dealing with only "the hard cases. . . in which legisla-
tive purposes are unclear or conflicting." 6 He reiterated that a
"prerequisite" for the application of the principles is "the absence
of any ascertainable legislative purpose in the forum's law."' 0
Cavers' doubt regarding the merit of the principles ostensibly has
carried over to the courts. Although one of the principles was
adopted expressly by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Ci-
polla v. Shaposka 1 they have not received general acceptance in
the courts.72
As discussed above, Professor Cavers' principles do not possess
the rationality that he claims for them. Cavers' failure to find ra-
tional standards by which to select among territorial contacts is a
flaw endemic to the territorial approach. By seeking to evaluate
occurrences according to their territorial significance, when in fact
one event has no more territorial importance than another, neoter-
ritorialists, like their traditional predecessors, err in searching for
rationality in a place where it does not reside. Under a territorial
approach, there can be no satisfactory resolution of cases com-
posed of multistate events. If one accepts the premise of territori-
ality, each state in which an event occurred has a claim for its law
to be applied in a multistate case, and there are no rational territo-
rial principles by which to select one state's law over another's.
The Interest Analysis
One of the primary advantages of the interest analysis is that
67. See note 58 supra.
68. See D. CAvERs, supra note 24, at 144-45.
69. Id. at 122. Nevertheless, later in his career, Cavers took the position that his seven
principles of preference should have a much broader application. Cavers, supra note 24, at
153.
70. D. CAVERS, supra note 24, at 215.
71. 439 Pa. 563, -, 267 A.2d 854, 856 n.3 (1970).
72. "[I]t is difficult to find subsequently decided cases that expressly follow any of
[Cavers'] illustrative 'principles."' R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 192 (3d ed. 1977).
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some conflicts of law are revealed to be "false conflicts." When
only one state has an interest in having its law govern a case, the
conflict is false and resolves itself in favor of following the law of
the interested state."3 To use an example described earlier, when
two parties from state A execute a contract in state B, only state A
has an interest in regulating the capacity of the parties to enter
into the contract. This false conflict results in application of the
law of state A.74
Many cases which seem to present conflicts of law under a terri-
torial approach are shown by the interest analysis to be false con-
flicts which resolve themselves rationally. Nevertheless, true con-
flicts can exist under the interest analysis. For example, in
Lilienthal v. Kaufman," an Oregon spendthrift contracted a debt
with a Californian. Oregon, but not California, recognized the
spendthrift defense. Because Oregon had an interest in protecting
the Oregon spendthrift, and California had an interest in protect-
ing the California creditor, the case presented a true conflict.7 6
A variety of methods has been proposed by choice of law schol-
ars and adopted by the courts for resolving true conflicts under the
interest analysis. Professor Currie, the "father" of the interest
analysis, believed that true conflicts should be decided by applying
the law of the forum. 7 Although admitting that courts balance
competing state interests in other circumstances, Currie concluded
that the weighing of the competing state interests is outside the
judicial function of the courts when two or more interested states
have contradictory policies.78 Therefore, when confronted with a
true conflict, a court should apply its own law79 so that it at least
can advance the policy of its own state.80
Only a few courts have adopted Currie's proposal for resolving
true conflicts in favor of forum law."1 Most advocates of the inter-
73. R. CRAMTON & D. CURm, supra note 17, at 220; Sedler, supra note 6, at 186-87.
74. See Sedler, supra note 6, at 186-87. See also text accompanying note 16 supra.
75. 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
76. Id. at _, 395 P.2d at 549.
77. B. CURRM, supra note 5, at 119, 183-84.
78. Id. at 182-83.
79. Id. at 182.
80. Id. at 119.
81. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, _ 395 P.2d 543, 549 (1964) (applying
forum law).
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est analysis also have rejected this approach to true conflicts,"2
some condemning it as an irrational way of deciding conflicts of
law.83 Professor Baxter notes that Currie's position is subject to
the same fault that Currie himself once ascribed to the traditional
approach: it will "casually defeat now the one and now the other
policy, depending upon a purely fortuitous circumstance,"8 only
now the fortuitous circumstance is the plaintiff's choice of forum.es
Other scholars add that, contrary to Currie's belief, balancing and
evaluating state interests is an entirely appropriate function for
the judiciary; indeed such balancing is something that it does all
the time." Still others assert that true conflicts can be resolved by
more satisfactory techniques, to be discussed below, which do not
involve the courts in weighing competing state interests.8 7
Better Rule of Law Approach
Several courts have resolved a true conflict by choosing what
they believe to be the better rule of law. 8 Among choice of law
scholars, Professor Leflar has been the foremost advocate of the
better rule of law approach,89 which has received mixed reviews
from his colleagues.90 Courts using this approach most commonly
82. "[A]s far as I can see, all courts and writers who have professed acceptance of Currie's
interest language have transformed it by indulging in that very weighing and balancing of
interests from which Currie refrained." Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts
Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARv. L. REV. 377, 389 (1966).
83. See, e.g., R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 203; McDougal, supra note 6, at 450.
84. B. CURRIE, supra note 5, at 120.
85. Baxter, supra note 6, at 19.
86. See McDougal, supra note 6, at 452; Sedler, supra note 6, at 217-18; von Mehren,
Book Review, 17 J. LE.AL EDUC. 91, 94-96 (1964).
87. A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS-CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 94-95 (1965); R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, at 203-04; Bax-
ter, supra note 6, at 20.
88. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, -, 203 N.W.2d 408, 414 (1973); Mitchell
v. Craft, 211 So. 2d 509, 514 (Miss. 1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, -, 222 A.2d 205,
209-10 (1966); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, -, 157 N.W.2d 579, 586-87 (1968).
89. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 72, at 212-15; Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influ-
encing Consideration, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1587-88 (1966).
90. For favorable discussions of the better rule of law approach, see R. WEINTRAUB, supra
note 6, at 244-45; Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule". Threat and Prom-
ise in Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 847, 853-55 (1967); Juenger, Choice of Law in
Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 235 (1969); for opposition to the better rule of law
approach, see B. CURRIE, supra note 5, at 154 n.82; Cavers, The Value of Principled Prefer-
[Vol. 22:227
THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS
regard one rule to be better than another because it is progressive
and represents the majority trend.9 1 Either the rule of law of the
forum or a rule of law that favors compensation for injured plain-
tiffs usually prevails as the more progressive standard.92 The seri-
ous drawback to the better rule of law approach is its failure to
acknowledge that the state whose law is not chosen also has
deemed, through its official processes, that its rule of law is the
better rule. Judges who use the better rule of law approach can
decide true conflicts only by closing their eyes to this fact. Thus,
this method ostensibly is less a resolution of true conflicts than a
sidestepping of them.
The Most Significant Relationship Test
The most significant relationship test is yet another means of
solving true conflicts which has been used by a few courts.93
Adopted in the second Restatement 94 as a general approach to tort
and contract choice of law problems, the most significant relation-
ship test operates by choosing the law of the state that has the
most significant relationship to a case. Application of the test often
devolves into nothing more than contact counting that provides no
standard for determining which contacts are significant.9 5 As Pro-
fessor Ehrenzweig astutely observes, the most significant relation-
ship test is circular in reasoning because the significance of the re-
lationship is the very question to be answered.96 Moreover,
experience has shown it to be a test that is manipulated easily "to
support virtually any result."9 " Strongly discredited by most com-
ences, 49 Tax. L. REV. 211, 212-15 (1971); Kanowitz, supra note 6, at 286-93.
91. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, _ 203 N.W.2d 408, 415 (1973); Clark v.
Clark, 107 N.H. 351, _, 222 A.2d 205, 208, 210 (1966).
92. See Kanowitz, supra note 6, at 290-93.
93. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 124-26, 209 N.E.2d 792, 794-97, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463,
466-68 (1965); Casey v. Manson Constr. and Eng'r Co., 247 Or. 274, -, 428 P.2d 898, 907
(1967).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188, Comment b (1971).
95. B. Cuama, supra note 5, at 727-28. See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175
N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
96. A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 45, at 351.
97. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for Its Withdrawal,
113 U. PA. L. Rav. 1230, 1241 (1965). For examples of the manipulative potential of the
most significant relationship test, see Lowe's N. Wilkesboro Hardware, Inc. v. Fidelity Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 469 (4th Cir. 1963); Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441,
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mentators" and increasingly passsed over by the courts, the most
significant relationship test has proven a failure.
The Comparative Impairment Test
One of the more substantial proposals for dealing with the prob-
lem of deciding true conflicts is the comparative impairment con-
cept. This concept builds upon the interest analysis, adding a
means of resolving true conflicts in a rational or purposive manner.
The comparative impairment concept was first articulated by Pro-
fessor Baxter,9  later championed by Professor Horowitz, 100 and
still later adopted and utilized by the California courts.101 Under
the comparative impairment concept, conflicting state policies are
not weighed to determine which is better or more important.102
Rather, the concept assumes that each state's policy is of equal
weight and seeks to evaluate the comparative impairment to each
state's policy if its law is not applied.10 3 Accordingly, a true conflict
will be resolved by following the law of the state whose policy
would suffer greater impairment by the subordination of its law.104
To illustrate how the comparative impairment concept operates,
Professor Baxter presents a hypothetical in which a citizen of state
Y, driving in excess of the speed limit in state X, injures another
citizen of state Y. According to the law of state X, but not state Y,
driving in excess of the speed limit constitutes negligence per se.
As the policy underlying the state Y rule concerns loss-distribution
rights for injuries, state Y certainly has an interest in having its
216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
98. See, e.g., B. CuRRiE, supra note 5, at 728; A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 45, at 351-52;
Ehrenzweig, supra note 97, at 1241; von Mehren, supra note 29, at 964; Weintraub, The
Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws-A Critique, 46 IOWA
L. REv. 713, 724 (1961).
99. Baxter, supra note 6, at 18-22.
100. Horowitz, supra note 6, at 747-58.
101. Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (1978); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr.
215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Hall v. University of Nev., 74 Cal. App. 3d 280, 141
Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977), afl'd sub nom. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979); Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Superior Ct., 61 Cal. App. 3d 501, 132 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976).
102. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, -, 546 P.2d 719, 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215,
219, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976); Horowitz, supra note 6, at 753.
103. Baxter, supra note 6, at 17-18.
104. See id. at 18; see Horowitz, supra note 6, at 748-49.
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law applied. The policy behind the state X rule is the deterrence of
dangerous conduct and the protection of X residents." 5 The case
thus presents a true conflict in that both states have an interest in
having their law regulate the controversy. Nevertheless, Professor
Baxter explains that the interest of state X will be the less im-
paired if its law is not applied to the case, because conduct on X
highways will not be affected by the knowledge that the X rule will
be subordinated in those rare instances involving two nonresidents.
The deterrent effect of state X's law will not be decreased appreci-
ably by choosing not to apply X law to cases in which all parties
are nonresidents. On the other hand, if Y law is not followed in a
suit between two Y citizens, the Y loss-distribution policy will be
defeated completely in all such cases. Therefore, state Y's interest
in having its law prevail is stronger than that of state X.106 Accord-
ing to the phraseology employed by Professors von Mehren and
Trautman, state Y is the "predominantly concerned jurisdic-
tion."10 7
In the abstract, the comparative impairment concept appears to
be a workable method of introducing rationality into the resolution
of true conflicts. However, application of the concept in actual
cases has been questioned. Professor Martin makes the cogent ob-
servation that although the comparative impairment concept is a
good idea when it works, it does not always work because there are
many situations in which the impairment to each state's policy is
roughly equal.108 Baxter's hypothetical concerning a negligence-
per-se rule illustrates how the comparative impairment concept
operates, but gives an overly optimistic impression of the concept's
viability by ascribing an incorrect purpose to the negligence-per-se
rule. Only by investing the rule with a policy of deterrence does
the state where the accident occurred have the less predominant
interest in having its law govern the controversy. Yet, the policy
105. Baxter, supra note 6, at 12. State X has an interest only if one agrees that the pur-
pose of its per se negligence rule is the deterrence of dangerous conduct. If one believes the
only purpose of the X rule is to compensate accident victims, state X has no interest be-
cause the victim is a resident of state Y. See text accompanying notes 142-53 infra for a
discussion of this issue in relation to guest-host statutes.
106. See Baxter, supra note 6, at 13.
107. A. VON MEHREN & D. TaAuTMAN, supra note 87, at 341-42.
108. J. M _Nn, supra note 63, at 259.
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underlying the negligence-per-se rule is a current issue of debate.
According to the modern view of torts, similar negligence rules are
intended to serve compensatory purposes, not admonitory or de-
terrent purposes. 10 9 If so, Professor Baxter's hypothetical presents
a false conflict which can be resolved easily, without using the
comparative impairment concept. Consequently, one wonders if
the comparative impairment concept is useful in cases that actu-
ally do present true conflicts. Perhaps, as Martin suggests, there
are few, if any, instances of true conflict that can be solved satis-
factorily by the concept of comparative impairment. The compara-
tive impairment concept may be nothing more than another way of
describing what Professor Currie referred to as an apparent con-
flict, that is, a seemingly true conflict which further analysis of
state interests reveals to be a false conflict. 110 If so, the compara-
tive impairment concept will be of limited utility.
Professor Kanowitz is highly critical of the comparative impair-
ment concept.1 ' He argues that the concept leads to unconscious
or conscious manipulation of data by the court in comparing the
impairment of each state's interest. An even more serious defect
asserted by Kanowitz is the inevitable implication of the kind of
weighing or value judgment that determines which policy is better
or worthier.112
These reprisals are unduly harsh, as every concept, principle,
rule, or approach is subject to manipulation. Professor Kanowitz in
no way demonstrates that the comparative impairment concept is
prone to an excessive amount of manipulation or even a relatively
undue amount of manipulation. If it is a helpful concept, the possi-
bility of misuse by some judges should not deter its adoption by
the courts. A similar response might also be made to Kanowitz'
second point. Although courts may use the comparative impair-
ment concept as little more than a guise for the weighing of state
interests generally ascribed to the better rule of law approach,1 as
did the court in Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,114 the
109. See B. Curm, supra note 5, at 144.
110. R. WaN~mTuB, supra note 6, at 39.
111. Kanowitz, supra note 6, at 260-64, 277-86.
112. Id. at 261.
113. Id. at 294.
114. 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
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concept's misuse should not be reason for its abandonment. If it is
a beneficial concept, it should be retained, and steps should be
taken to prevent its misuse. Nevertheless, whether the comparative
impairment concept can be a valuable tool for dealing with true
conflicts remains to be seen. While the concept offers a rational
means for deciding true conflicts in the abstract, there may be few
actual cases where the concept can be of any real use.
Reformulated Interest Analysis
Professor Sedler recently proposed a "reformulation" of Currie's
interest analysis115 which includes a slight revision of Currie's ap-
proach to the true conflict. Sedler suggests that once a forum de-
termines it has a "real interest" in applying its own law to effectu-
ate the policy reflected by that law, the forum should apply that
law without considering the real interests of any other state in-
volved.11 Thus, as Currie advocated, the courts would always ap-
ply forum law in true conflict cases. 1 7 Underlying Sedler's position
is the thought that as long as a state has an interest in a case, the
function of its courts should be to advance its own state policies,
not the policies of other states. 18
If courts functioned in this manner, parochialism would be a jus-
tifiable accusation. Professor Sedler's suggestion would result in
the selection of forum law even when the forum state was not the
predominantly concerned jurisdiction. Sedler nevertheless defends
the rationality of his reformulated approach on the ground that
whenever courts have purported to apply "objective criteria" to de-
In Offshore Rental, a California corporation brought a negligence action against a Louisi-
ana corporation for the loss of services of a key employee. In contrast to California case law,
Louisana law did not recognize a cause of action by a corporate plaintiff for the loss of
services of an officer. Although the court in Offshore Rental asserted that the comparative
impairment concept does not entail the weighing of the respective state interests or the
determination of the "worthier" social policy, the court then proceeded to engage in the
admonished balancing process: "We therefore conclude that the trial judge in the present
case correctly applied Louisiana, rather than California, law, since California's interest in
the application of its unusual and outmoded statute is comparatively less strong than Loui-
siana's corollary interest, so lately expressed, in its 'prevalent and progressive' law." 22 Cal.
3d at , 583 P.2d at 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
115. Sedler, supra note 6, at 181.
116. Id. at 221-22, 227.
117. Id. at 227.
118. See id. at 221.
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cide true conflicts, "they have skewed the criteria in favor of the
application of their own law."'1 9 If so, some courts simply have
mishandled the criteria; such misuse does not necessarily mean
that the criteria are not worthy or should be abandoned. Moreover,
I do not believe that courts "skew" criteria in favor of the applica-
tion of their own law as often as Professor Sedler implies. While
skewing does occur at times, a substantial number of true conflict
cases in which courts have applied the law of some other state
demonstrate that skewing is not the norm. 120 Although Professor
Sedler is one of the leading contemporary scholars of choice of law
and has made many fine contributions to the field, his reformu-
lated method of resolving true conflicts has not proven meritorious.
His approach, which follows forum law rigidly in all true conflicts,
serves no rational purpose.
Perhaps there never will be a satisfactory method for resolving
most true conflicts. If not, this should not be taken as a defeat of
the interest analysis. True conflicts exist because the world is not
politically unified, but composed of separate states with varying
laws. No choice of law methodology can change that situation or
provide perfect solutions to every choice of law problem. Under
territorialism, there is no rationality whatsoever to choice of law
decision making. The interest analysis at least provides rationality
to most choice of law decisions, particularly those involving false
conflicts. Perhaps that is the most that can be hoped for.
RULES VERSUS PROCESS
Territorialists assert that their approach has the advantage of
being more rule-oriented than the functionalism of the interest
analysis.""' They characterize the interest analysis as an ad hoc de-
cisional process that does not produce rules as does territorial-
119. Id. at 232.
120. See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961);
People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957); Dym v. Gordon, 16
N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); Casey v. Manson Constr. & Eng'r Co.,
247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co., 57 Wis.2d 588, 204 N.W.2d
897 (1973).
121. Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 548, 566 (1971);
Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 459, 463-64 (1967). See also
Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315, 333-34 (1972).
248 [Vol. 22:227
THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS
ism. 122 Rules, of course, are said to be desirable because they invest
the law with stability, certainty, and uniformity.12
There are several rebuttals to these arguments. First, certainty
and uniformity should not be sought at the expense of incorrect
decision making. As previously discussed, territorial rules operate
in ignorance of the policies for which the laws were enacted and
thus often frustrate those policies.124 Put another way, territorial
rules often lead to injustice. It is more important that choice of law
decisions serve justice than certainty and uniformity. No matter
how certain and uniform territorial rules are, they should not be
adopted when to do so derogates the very policies for which laws
were promulgated.
Moreover, it is questionable whether the interest analysis is, as
its critics maintain, an ad hoc process incapable of producing rules.
The interest analysis is by no means ad hoc; to describe it as such
demonstrates a, misunderstanding of how the interest analysis op-
erates. On the other hand, the interest analysis is a less rule-ori-
ented system than the territorial approach. As their names state,
the latter is an approach, while the former is a mode of analysis.
Approaches place greater emphasis on rule production than do
modes of analysis. Under an approach, the emphasis is upon rules,
while under a mode of analysis the emphasis is on policy. Ap-
proaches stress formalistic logic; analyses stress in depth under-
standing.125 Nevertheless, this difference should not be exaggerated
unduly; the production of rules under modes of analysis, including
the interest analysis, is not impossible or even difficult. Whether or
not rules are forthcoming is also a function of how legal systems
are wielded by the judges who are in charge of them. Exhibiting
more concern with policy and justice, most modern judges are less
devoted than their predecessors to constructing elaborate bodies of
hard and fast rules. Nevertheless, the interest analysis is capable of
producing rules when the judges who use it care to do so.
122. Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, supra note 121, at 552, 566; Rosenberg,
supra note 121, at 464.
123. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, supra note 121, at 316; Reese, Chief
Judge Fuld and the Choice of Law, supra note 121, at 562.
124. See notes 13-22 supra & accompanying text.
125. But see Sedler, supra note 6, at 209 (contrasting interest analysis and territorialism
by referring to the former as an "approach" and to the latter as a system of "rules").
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Under the common law system, rules are developed from cases.
Since the interest analysis is not an aberration of the common law
method, rules of choice of law can be developed from court deci-
sions.126 To prove this point, Sedler, after reviewing conflicts torts
cases in jurisdictions that have adopted the interest analysis, was
able to identify no less than nine conflicts torts rules that have
emerged clearly from the cases.127 These rules are relatively easy to
discern and are no less distinct than territorial rules. The interest
analysis thus seems amenable to the production of rules.
Rules, however, may not be as desirable as traditionalists as-
sume. Another point of controversy between legal traditionalists
and realists 28 concerns the value of rules. Legal realists maintain
that the traditional devotion to-some would say obsession
with-rules is misguided. It exalts certainty and uniformity over
correct decision making and justice. In addition, too much stability
restrains the legal process and makes needed change difficult to
accomplish. 29 But perhaps the most telling criticism that realists
126. See Sedler, supra note 8, at 979-81.
127. Sedler's analysis of the conflicts torts cases produced nine rules: (1) forum law ap-
plies when two residents of the forum are involved in an accident in another state; (2) recov-
ery is allowed when the parties to an accident are residents of a state with a recovery stat-
ute, but are involved in the accident in a nonrecovery state; (3) forum law should apply
when two residents of a nonrecovery state are involved in an accident in a recovery state
and institute the cause of action in the recovery state; (4) forum law should apply when a
resident of the forum is injured in the forum as a result of an act committed therein or in a
location with the foreseeable risk of harm resulting in the forum state; (5) absent unfairness
to the defendant, forum law should apply when a plaintiff, resident of a recovery state, is
injured by the defendant in his state of residence, a nonrecovery state; (6) the defendant's
state of residence will apply its own law denying recovery when a plaintiff from a recovery
state is injured by defendant, and sues in the nonrecovery state; (7) the commission or omis-
sion of an act by the defendant in a state whose laws are grounded in a deterrence policy
will result in liability for the defendant when the resultant harm occurs in another state; (8)
recovery will usually be awarded to a plaintiff from a nonrecovery state, irrespective of the
place of the accident's occurrence, when the defendant is a resident of a recovery state; (9)
an employer's tort liability to an employee covered by workmen's compensation is governed
by the law of the state in which the employer obtained coverage for the particular employee.
Id. at 1033-39.
128. For a discussion of the substantive differences between legal realists and traditional-
ists, see the text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
129. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 6-7 (1930).
Our society would be strait-jacketed were not the courts, with the able assis-
tance of the lawyers, constantly overhauling the law and adapting it to the
realities of ever-changing social, industrial and political conditions; although
changes cannot be made lightly, yet law must be more or less impermanent,
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level at rules is that the certainty and uniformity ostensibly pro-
duced is, at best, superficial.1 s0 True certainty and uniformity can-
not be achieved by rules because rules suffer necessarily from one
of two flaws; they are either too general or too specific. When too
general, laws provide little, if any, guidance. As Jerome Frank
argues, "[a] generalization is empty so far as it is general.' 3 When
empty and providing a minimum of guidance, general rules fail to
evince certainty or uniformity. On the other hand, when rules are
specific, they become rigid and incapable of dealing with the multi-
tudinous factual permutations that arise in cases. Inevitably, an
exception must be grafted upon the rule and then another and an-
other, with exceptions to the exceptions soon to follow. Each ex-
ception required decreases the amount of certainty and uniformity
of the original rule. Rule specificity, then, leads to little more sta-
bility than does its antithesis, generality.
Reaching a compromise between specificity and generality is im-
possible for all but the rarest of rules. The law must deal with
problems as vast and complex as life itself and therefore cannot be
reduced to neat formulae that are capable of treating those
problems with certainty and uniformity.1 3 2 A court opinion, like a
novel, play, or poem, cannot be reduced to a shorthand statement
of its meaning without losing much of that meaning. Holdings of
cases stated as rules tell us something about the cases but also
omit important details. Were it not so, students, teachers, lawyers,
and judges would never have to read judicial opinions to under-
stand the law. To the contrary, we are all cognizant of the fact that
experimental, and therefore not nicely calculable. Much of the uncertainty of
law is not an unfortunate accident: it is of immense social value.
Id.
The art of free society consists first in the maintenance of the symbolic code;
and secondly in fearlessness of revision, to secure that the code serves those
purposes which satisfy an enlightened reason. Those societies which cannot
combine reverence to their symbols with freedom of revision, must ultimately
decay either from anarchy, or from the slow atrophy of a life stifled by useless
shadows.
A. WHITEHEAD, SYMBOLISM, ITS MEANING AND EFFECT 88 (1927).
130. See K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 21-27 (1962).
131. J. FRANK, supra note 129, at 124-25 (quoting Holmes, J.).
132. "The law deals with human relations in their most complicated aspects. The whole
confused, shifting helter-skelter of life parades before it-more confused than ever, in our
kaleidoscopic age." Id. at 6.
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the sine qua non of legal understanding is reading the opinions.
Rules can never be anything other than shorthand abbreviations
for complex legal concepts, doctrines, and ways of thinking. As
such, rules cannot be relied upon for certainty or uniformity.
In fact, to the extent that certainty and uniformity can be effec-
tuated, they probably are attained more readily through a process
than through a rule-oriented approach. Unlike rules, processes al-
low one to deal with the complexities of law, and therefore lead to
a deeper understanding of the law. The formalism of rules results
in the production of shallow certainty and uniformity, while the
analytical nature of processes leads to a more genuine certainty
and uniformity.
The specious certainty and uniformity that rules seem to provide
is often accomplished by manipulating rules so as to achieve what
Jerome Frank called "verbal stability." 138 Verbal stability entails
the retention of an old rule in its verbal form and the association
of the old rule with new meanings, so as in effect to produce a new
rule.1 34 Thus, a rule seems consistent on its face, when in fact it
operates inconsistently. There is a stability of words, but not of
content. This phenomenon is no stranger to conflict of law cases
under the territorial approach. In fact, it occurs often enough in
territorial cases to be treated in choice of law textbooks under its
own heading: "characterization." 13 5 The term "characterization"
refers to the practice of manipulating choice of law rules by char-
acterizing or labelling the legal issues presented by a case. If, for
instance, an issue is characterized as a tort issue, it will call for a
particular territorial rule that selects a certain state's law. On the
other hand, if it is characterized as a contract issue, it will call for
a different territorial rule that may select a different state's law.
Since many issues combine elements of two or more legal catego-
ries, a great deal of leeway, and thus a great deal of manipulation,
are possible in characterizing issues. 186
133. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRuIL 277 (1963).
134. Id.
135. See, e.g., A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, supra note 87, at 436.
136. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.) (res ipsa loquitur
characterized as procedural), cert. dismissed sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526,
211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (measure of damages rule characterized as procedural); Carolina
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Characterization is an instance of verbal stability that gives the
territorial approach a facade of stability but not the reality of it.
Characterization is not an uncommon occurrence under the territo-
rial approach; to the contrary, it is pervasive.187 It is not the only
device that causes spurious stability, as other manipulative devices
abound in the territorial approach. Among those are the renvoi
doctrine, 8 the dichotomy between substance and procedure,13 9 the
exceptions for public policy,1 40 and the exceptions for penal and
fiscal laws.1 41 Each device decreases the amount of certainty and
uniformity that territorial rules purportedly carry. Thus, territorial
rules are not nearly as stable as their adherents claim. Indeed, true
stability is more probable with a process such as the interest analy-
sis than with a rule-oriented approach such as territorialism. By
emphasizing depth of reasoning, the interest analysis produces
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Oregon Auto Ins. Co., 242 Or. 407, 408 P.2d 198 (1965) (admissibility of
parol evidence characterized as substantive); McGrath v. Tobin, 81 R.I. 415, 103 A.2d 795
(1954) (characterizing Massachusetts' wrongful death act as "penal" and unenforceable in
Rhode Island). Compare Fisher v. Home Indem. Co., 198 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1952) (charac-
terizing direct-action statute as substantive), and Torcazo v. Statema, 141 F. Supp. 769
(N.D. IlM. 1956) (characterizing "no action" clause as matter of tort), with Noe v. United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 406 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1966) (characterizing direct-action statute
as procedural), and Ritterbusch v. Sexmith, 256 Wis. 507, 41 N.W.2d 611 (1950) (character-
izing "no action" clause as contract matter).
137. R. CRAMTON & D. CuRm, supra note 17, at 68-69.
138. Renvoi refers to the occurrence wherein a court in state A chooses the law of B to
govern a case before it, but the choice-of-law rules of state B concerning the conflicts case
turn to the law of state A to govern the case. Since forums are not consistent in their accept-
ance or rejection of the renvoi (reference back to their own law), legal stability is decreased.
See Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization, Localization and Preliminary Question in the
Conflict of Laws, 14 S. CAL. L. REv. 221, 249-51 (1941). For further discussion of the renvoi
doctrine, see Falconbridge, Renvoi and the Law of the Domicile, 19 CAN. B. Rav. 311 (1941);
Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HRv. L. REV. 1165 (1938).
139. W. REE sE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 7, at 435. Under the territorial approach,
even though another state's substantive law is selected to govern a case, the forum is free to
follow its own procedural law. Horowitz, supra note 6, at 741-42. This leads to a great deal
of uncertainty.
140. W. REEsE & M. RoSENBERG, supra note 7, at 509. The territorial approach allows a
court to refuse to apply another state's law (that otherwise would govern the case) if that
law is thought to violate the public policy of the forum, thus fostering uncertainty in the
application of a forum's law. See id.
141. Penal and revenue laws constitute exceptions to the traditional rule mandating the
enforcement of foreign causes of action. These exceptions necessarily derogate the objectives
of certainty and uniformity. Under the territorial approach to conflicts problems, a forum
may refuse to enforce foreign penal and revenue claims contrary to the public policy of the
forum. R. CRAMTON & D. CURRE, supra note 17, at 131-37.
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more genuine stability than does the superficial logic of territorial
rules.
Focus OF THE CONTROVERSY: THE GUEST STATUTE CASES
A sharp difference of opinion exists between territorialists and
interest analysts concerning multistate tort cases in which one
state has a guest statute that would prohibit recovery and another
state does not.142 Territorialists believe that such cases should be
governed by the law of the place where the accident occurred,
while most adherents of the interest analysis regard the place of
occurrence as an irrelevant factor for choosing which law to follow.
Territorialists maintain that tort laws, including the rules gov-
erning guest-host relationships, do not serve the mere purpose of
compensating injured persons, but also serve the purpose of deter-
ring wrongful conduct. Tort laws are purported to be admonitory
because they are meant to prevent harmful conduct within the ter-
ritory of a state.143 From this premise, territorialists argue that the
guest-host rules prove the soundness of territorialism. 1" Territori-
alists extrapolate from guest-host rules, which they believe to be
territorially based, to assert that all laws are territorially based.
Surely this argument is excessive. The basis of one law in territo-
rial principles does not extend to all other laws. As explained pre-
viously, some laws are meant to govern events within a territory
and some are not.145 Under the interest analysis, those laws that
are territorially based can be recognized as such, and a state's ter-
ritorial interest in them can be afforded the application it mer-
its.' 46 The interest analysis demonstrates, however, that some laws
are meant to operate territorially and others are not.
The question that remains is whether the territorialists are cor-
rect in stating that guest-host rules are territorially based because
they are meant to deter or admonish conduct within a state. The
existence of criminal laws which penalize wrongful conduct that
142. Similarly, the dispute thrives in situations in which one state has an intrafamily im-
munity law barring recovery and another state does not.
143. See D. CAvERs, supra note 24, at 139-40.
144. See id. at 140-41.
145. See pp. 233-34 supra.
146. See notes 36-37 supra & accompanying text.
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also constitutes a tort is one indication that tort laws are compen-
satory and not admonitory. This argument is consistent with the
modern view of tort law, which rejects the penal or admonitory
purpose. 147 Nevertheless, Professor Cavers maintains that tort laws
also constitute an admonitory "second line of defense" against
harmful conduct.1 48 While some advocates of the interest analysis
agree that tort laws serve an admonitory function,141 most main-
tain that tort laws are purely compensatory.150 The courts also are
divided on this issue. 151
The significant difference between the presence and the absence
of a guest statute is generally overlooked in this debate. When one
state does not have a guest statute or similar rule, its interest, if
any, is in the application of its laws making negligence an actiona-
ble tort. Those laws may or may not be admonitory; the issue is
highly debatable. When the other state does have a guest statute,
it can hardly be said that the state's interest is admonitory. In the
first place, guest statutes do not admonish conduct; to the con-
trary, they immunize conduct from liability. Second, the conduct
that is immunized by guest statutes certainly is not conduct that
any state encourages. 5 2 It is, after all, tortious conduct causing
harm. Thus, it can be concluded that guest statutes are not in any
way admonitory. While a state's tort laws in the absence of a guest
statute may or may not be admonitory, guest statutes clearly are
not.
When an accident occurs in a state having a guest statute that
would bar recovery, and the guest and the host are nonresidents,
147. See E. CHEATHAM, H. GOODRIcH, E. GRISWOLD & W. REESE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS 424 (3d ed. 1951).
148. D. CAvERs, supra note 24, at 140.
149. See, e.g., Trautman, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson: A Comment, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 465-66 (1967).
150. See generally Sedler, supra note 8, at 1035; Sedler, Judicial Method is "Alive and
Well": The Kentucky Approach to Choice of Law in Interstate Automobile Accidents, 61
Ky. L.J. 378, 382-83 (1973).
151. See, e.g., Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968) (compensatory); Neumeier
v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972) (admonitory and com-
pensatory); Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.2d 519 (1969) (com-
pensatory); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963)
(compensatory); Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970) (admonitory and
compensatory); Labree v. Major, 111 R.I. 657, 306 A.2d 808 (1973) (compensatory).
152. See Twerski, supra note 7, at 378.
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the state where the injury occurred has no interest in having its
law govern the controversy between the guest and the host. It has
no interest in protecting the host from liability, because the host,
being a nonresident, is not within the governmental responsibility
of the state. Nor does the state have an interest in encouraging or
even allowing the guest's conduct within its borders, because no
state favors harmful conduct. In these circumstances, the fact that
an injury occurs in a guest statute state is irrelevant, and that
state's law should not be chosen to govern the case.
When an accident occurs in a state that does not have a guest
statute, and the guest and host are nonresidents, the state where
the accident occurred has an interest in having its law govern the
controversy between the guest and host only if one believes that
tort laws serve an admonitory purpose. If so, and if the plaintiff is
from a guest statute state, but the defendant is from a non-guest
statute state, the case presents a false conflict calling for the appli-
cation of the law of the state where the accident occurred. If, how-
ever, the defendant is from a guest statute state, the case presents
a true conflict that is not resolved so easily. Of course, if one be-
lieves that tort laws are purely compensatory, then the place of
injury is entirely irrelevant, and its laws should never govern.
Guest statute cases have proven to be more problematic for
choice of law decision making than most other kinds of cases. This
is attested by the large amount of guest statute choice of law cases
that arise in the courts.158 These cases are complicated by the
sharp difference of opinion concerning whether tort rules are
purely compensatory or also serve an admonitory purpose. Regard-
less of the purpose underlying other tort rules, guest statutes do
not have an admonitory purpose and thus ostensibly enable an eas-
ier resolution of the choice of law dilemma in such cases.
CONCLUSION
The territorial approach to choice of law. operates in the tradi-
tional mode of legal thinking referred to by Karl Llewellyn as the
153. See, e.g., Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968); Milkovich v. Saari, 295
Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Griggs v. Riley, 489 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972);
Gagne v. Berry, 112 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624 (1972); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis.2d 468, 157
N.W.2d 579 (1968).
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Formal Style.154 In the traditional mode, the territorial approach
emphasizes formalistic rules and logic that often are devoid of pol-
icy or purposes. Territorial rules present a facade of stability, but
fail to produce real certainty and uniformity. Underneath their for-
mal logic, they are irrational in .the choice of law decisions that
they dictate. Nevertheless, the greatest failure of territorialism is
its lack of functionalism, its blindness to the purposes of laws.
The interest analysis, which has its roots in the works of Cook,
Lorenzen, and Cavers, was conceived in reaction to the inadequacy
of territorialism. By the early 1960's, the basic structure of the in-
terest analysis had been outlined by Brainerd Currie. Additions to
and remodelling of that structure were provided by such scholars
as von Mehren, Trautman, Baxter, Horowitz, and Sedler. The in-
terest analysis has had a profound and extensive effect upon the
choice of law process, as evidenced by the rejection of the tradi-
tional approach in conflicts torts cases in twenty-seven jurisdic-
tions. 5 Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to state that the interest
analysis has revolutionized choice of law decision making. The in-
terest analysis now exemplifies a comprehensive methodology for
choice of law decision making that has proven itself in actual prac-
tice in the courts.158 It operates in the Grand Style,1 57 thereby
bringing rationality and purpose to the choice of law process. It is
thoroughly capable of producing the degree of certainty and uni-
formity that may be desirable in the legal process. Above all, the
interest analysis is functional; choice of law decisions are made
with the intent of accomplishing the policies for which laws are
enacted.
154. See notes 18-21 supra & accompanying text.
155. Sedler, supra note 8, at 976 n.2.
156. Id. at 975-76.
157. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
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